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CRIMINAL LAW OF MISSOURI
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW OF MISSOURI
BY J. HUGO GRIMM
The past quarter of a century has witnessed such frequent and
severe criticism of the administration of the criminal law in the
United States, not only in the lay press, but in legal journals
and the addresses of distinguished lawyers and even judges
(part of the criticism being directed against the law of proce-
dure as it exists today, and part against the attitude of the
courts), that it has occurred to the writer that it might be well
to make a fairly complete and careful study of the course of leg-
islation and judicial decision relating to criminal procedure in
order to learn whether real progress has not been made in the
development of this aspect of the criminal law. As the field is
very large we will confine ourselves to the State of Missouri, a
choice we deem particularly appropriate in view of the careful
crime survey made by the Missouri Society for Criminal Justice
in 1925, the report of which was published a year later.
To form any fair idea of what has been accomplished the study
must cover a considerable period of time, and this will necessi-
tate an avoidance of some detail.
As a proper background a view, in broad outline, of the crim-
inal law as it existed in England and the American Colonies just
prior to our Declaration of Independence will be interesting and
desirable for various reasons. It was just at this time that
Blackstone's Commentaries were published, the first volume in
1765, the last in 1769. As is well-known this work had a tre-
mendous influence in this country, where, according to a state-
ment contained in one of Burke's speeches, more copies were sold
than in England itself. In his fourth book Blackstone gives a
clear exposition of the criminal law as it obtained in England in
his day, and indeed gives an account of its development from
early times.
Blackstone states that practically all felonies were punishable
by death and deplores the fact that 160 different offenses were so
punishable, and this without benefit of clergy.' In speaking of
14 BL. COMM. *18.
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the need of a revision and amendment of the criminal law, Black-
stone after suggesting a reference of proposed legislation to a
committee of experts continues, "Had such a reference taken
place, it is impossible that in the eighteenth century it could
ever have been made a capital crime to break down (however
maliciously) the mound of a fish pond, whereby any fish shall
escape; or to cut down a cherry tree in an orchard, * * *
or to be seen for one month in the company of persons who call
themselves, or are called Egyptians (Gypsies). It is true that
these outrageous penalties, being seldom or never inflicted, are
hardly known to be law by the public; but that rather aggravates
the mischief, by laying a snare for the unwary. ' 2 The accused
could not testify in his own behalf. Indeed as Blackstone points
out, anciently no witnesses could be sworn in his behalf, although
this was changed long before his time.3 The accused was not
entitled to be represented by counsel except to present some
point of law, but the judges, be it said to their credit, were quite
liberal in allowing such assistance.4
On the other hand, prosecution for felonies had to be by indict-
ment; an accused could peremptorily challenge twenty jurors (at
an earlier date thirty-five) while the Crown was not allowed
any;5 and the accused, if he could read and write, was given the
benefit of clergy in all felonies, unless this right was expressly
excluded by the statute."
No doubt because of the severity of the punishment in felony
cases and other serious disadvantages under which the accused
labored (the result of harsh and unjust rules of law) the courts,
moved by humane considerations, went to great lengths in decid-
ing that failure to observe technical requirements relatingto mere
matters of form in indictments and slight variances between the
allegations contained in these instruments and the evidence war-
ranted a discharge of the accused. This was carried to such an
extreme that Sir Mathew Hale, whom Blackstone referred to as
a most humane judge, sounded a solemn warning in the follow-
ing vigorous language:
2Ibid. *4. 'Ibid. *354.
a Ibid. *359. Ibid. *367.
'Ibid. *355.
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That in favor of life great strictnesses have been in all
times required in points of indictments, and the truth is
that it has grown to be a blemish and inconvenience in the
law and administration thereof. More offenders escape by
the over easy ear given to exceptions in indictments, than
by their own innocence, and in many times gross murders,
burglaries, robberies and other heinous and crying offenses
escape by these unseemly niceties to the reproach of the law,
to the shame of the government, and to the encouragement
of villainy and to the dishonor of God. And it were fit that
by some law this overgrown nicety were reformed which has
now become a disease in the law and will, I fear, in time
grow mortal without some timely remedy.7
That was the state of the law when the Federal Constitution
was adopted in 1789. The statesmen who framed that notable
instrument and the first eleven amendments thereto seemed im-
pressed with the necessity of protecting the citizen in his rights,
especially protecting him against tyranny or oppression. And
so we find that the Constitution strictly defines treason, which
at common law was a rather expansive term including many dif-
ferent acts. It provides that no bill of attainder and no ex post
facto law be passed; that all prosecutions for felony be by indict-
ment, no doubt having in mind the proceedings of the odious
Court of Star Chamber which had been abolished. The accused
must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; he
shall have a speedy public trial; he must be confronted with the
witnesses against him; he need not give evidence against himself
in a criminal case; he is entitled to the assistance of counsel for
his defense; moreover excessive bail must not be required nor
cruel or unusual punishment inflicted; and.the accused must not
be put in jeopardy more than once for any offense.
'2 Hale, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 193. The great chief Justice (Hale) had
in other parts of the volume, and preceding the above quotation, pointed
out that the misspelling of the latin word murdravit by inserting an "e"
between the letters "all and "r" had resulted in discharge of the accused;
that it was enough to vitiate an indictment if it failed to allege in which
hand the assailant held the weapon, or on which side of the body the wound
was inflicted, although if the indictment charged the assault and wounding
to have been done with a sword (cumquodam gladio) a conviction could be
sustained by proof that the killing was by some other weapon. The law
was neither consistent nor just, and in many respects was so harsh and
severe that one can hardly be surprised that judges resorted to techni-
calities which were often quite senseless in order to alleviate its injustice.
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When Missouri became a state just one-third of a century later
it incorporated in its first constitution the substance of the pro-
visions in the Federal Constitution just referred to, and added
one other, namely, that the indictment must conclude with the
words "against the peace and dignity of the State."8
Missouri had been a part of Louisiana Territory. Edward
Livingston, a lawyer of distinction and ability, had proposed for
Louisiana a code of civil procedure which was adopted in 1805;
and in 1820 under an act of the Legislature of that State he also
prepared a code of criminal procedure, which, although it was
not enacted into law, nevertheless exerted a great influence
throughout the country. And it was during this same period
that Jeremy Bentham was carrying on his agitation for reform
of the law, not only in England but in America as well.9
These efforts for reform had an influence which seems to have
reached the leaders of the Missouri Legislature, for we find that
in the session of 1825 benefit of clergy was abolished (anticipat-
ing similar legislation in England by two years).1o That Legis-
lature also abolished the ancient appeals for felony; it enacted
laws providing that in cases of treason and felony it should not be
necessary to ask the accused how he would be tried; if he stood
mute a plea of not guilty should be entered for him.11 This Leg-
islature further provided that one accused of a capital offense
should be furnished with a copy of the indictment and a list of
the jury two full days'before the day of the trial; also that where
'Mo. Const. (1820) art. 5, sec. 19.
' See Bentham's letter to President Madison, 1811; also his letter to the
Governor of Pennsylvania, 1814; his letter to the Governors of the Several
States, 1817; and his address to citizens of the U. S., July, 1817. See also
his paper relative to codification. 4 Bentham's WORKS (Bowring ed. 1843)
451.
" The reader will no doubt be interested and perhaps surprised to know
that benefit of clergy was recognized not only in Colonial times but for
some time after the Revolution, and was allowed in State v. Sutcliff in South
Carolina as late as 1855. White, LEGAL ANTIQUITIES (1911) 239.
1R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 319, sec. 21. Blackstone, after describing the
dreadful penalty at common law for obstinately standing mute when ar-
raigned for felony, states that, to the honor of the English law, it has been
enacted by statute, 12 Geo. III c. 20, that standing obstinately mute when
arraigned for a felony shall be taken as a conviction of same. This has
since been changed in England so that a plea of not guilty is entered as
here.
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defendant was arraigned for a crime punishable by death or im-
prisonment for life, he should have twenty peremptory chal-
lenges and in lesser offences ten, without any for the state.12
The Constitution having carefully guarded the rights of the
accused, and the Legislature in 1825 having supplemented these
constitutional safeguards with other legislative provisions which
they believed secured him a fair and impartial trial, these early
legislators no doubt felt that it was time to put an end to the dis-
charge of accused persons because of the "over-grown nicety"
with respect to formal objections to indictments which evoked
the warning of Justice Hale, and so they enacted:
That hereafter no indictment shall be quashed or set aside
for want of the words "with force and arms" or any such
words; and indictments and proceedings in criminal cases
may be amended in matter of form at any time before thejury are sworn for the trial of the case.13
A later Legislature (just which is not clear) passed the fol-
lowing law:"
No indictment shall be deemed invalid, nor shall the trial,judgment or other proceeding thereon be stayed, arrested,
or in any manner affected; First, By reason of the omis-
sion or misstatement of the defendant's title, occupation, es-
tate or degree, or of the county or town of his residence,
where the defendant shall not be misled or prejudiced by
such omission or misstatement; or Second, By the omission
of the words "with force and arms" or any words of similar
import; or Third, By omitting to charge any offence to have
been contrary to a statute or statutes, notwithstanding such
offence may have been created, or the punishment declared
by a statute, or Fourth, By reason of any defect or imperfec-
tion in matters of form which shall not tend to the prejudice
of the defendant.
In a case arising several years after the passage of this stat-
ute, the Supreme Court ordered the defendant discharged be-
cause the indictment, which was one for assault, gave the name
of the person assaulted as "Silas Mehlville" while the proof show-
"R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 320, sec. 23.
R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 320, sec. 24.
"This act first appeared in R. S. Mo. (1845) c. 138, art. 4, sec. 17.
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ed that his name was "Melvin."Ir" A careful reading of the act
just quoted will show that it did not reach this variance. It
seems to refer only to defects or errors in form in the indictment
itself. The Supreme Court had held an indictment invalid which
alleged that defendant did strike and thrust the deceased "in and
upon the left side of the belly and also upon the right side of the
shoulder, giving the deceased then and there, in and upon the left
side of the belly and also upon the right shoulder one wound,"
because, the court said, the allegations were repugnant since they
alleged one wound in two places on the body, which were removed
from each other.16 It had also held, after the above act had gone
into effect, that an indictment laying an offense on a future im-
possible date was fatally defective.17
Having in mind, no doubt, these and other cases decided after
this act as well as the many technical rules of the common law,
the Missouri Legislature in 1855 adopted the following, among
other criminal statutes:
Whenever, on the trial of any indictment for any felony or
misdemeanor, there shall appear to be any variance between
the statement in such indictment and the evidence offered in
proof thereof, in the Christian name or surname, or both
Christian name and surname, or other description whatso-
ever, or of any person whomsoever therein named or de-
scribed; or in the ownership of any property named or de-
scribed therein, such variance shall not be deemed grounds
for an acquittal of the defendant, unless the court before
which the trial shall be had shall find that such variance is
material to the merits of the case, and prejudicial to the de-
fence of the defendant.
No indictment shall be deemed invalid, nor shall the trial,judgment or other proceedings thereon, be stayed, arrested,
or in any manner affected; First, By reason of the omission
or nilsstatement of the defendant's title, occupation, estate
or degree, or of the county or town of his residence; or Sec-
ond, By the omission of the words "with force and arms,"
or any words of similar import; or Third, By omitting to
charge any offence to have been contrary to a statute or
statutes, notwithstanding such offence may have been creat-
State v. Curran (1853), 18 Mo. 320.
State v. Jones (1854), 20 Mo. 58.
"Morkley v. State (1847), 10 Mo. 291.
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ed, or the punishment declared, by a statute; or Fourth, Nor
for omitting the words "as appears by the record"; nor for
omitting to state the time at which the offence was com-
mitted in any case where time is not of the essence of the of-
fence; nor for stating the time imperfectly; nor for stating
the offence to have been committed on a day subsequent to
the finding of the indictment, or on an impossible day, or on
a day that never happened; nor for want of a proper or per-
fect name; nor for want of a proper venue; nor for want of
any venue at all; nor for want of a statement of the value or
price of anything or the amount of damages, injury or spoil
in any case where the value or price, or the amount of dam-
ages or injury or spoil is not of the essence of the offence,
nor for the want of an allegation of the time or place of any
material fact, when the time and place have once been stated
in the indictment; nor that dates and numbers are repre-
sented by figures; nor for an omission to allege that the
grand jurors were empanelled, sworn or charged; nor for
any surplusage or repugnant allegation, when there is suf-
ficient matter alleged to indicate the crime and person
charged; nor for want of the averment of any matter not
necessary to be proved; nor for any other defect or imper-
fection which does not tend to the prejudice of the substan-
tial rights of the defendant upon the merits.18
On the margin of each of the above acts as well as of four
others following them is to be found the notation, "14 and 15
Vict. c. 100," indicating the source of these statutes, although
as already pointed out, the prior Missouri law antedated the Eng-
lish act and is the forerunner of section 27 just quoted.
No one can read these last two sections, having in mind com-
mon law rulings and prior decisions of the Missouri Supreme
Court, without reaching the conclusion that the aim and purpose
of the legislature was to prevent persons accused of crime being
discharged because of a failure to observe formal and merely
artificial allegations in indictments, or because of a variance be-
tween the allegations of the indictments and the evidence, unless
of such a nature as to prejudice the substantial rights of de-
fendant.
To leave no doubt in the matter the lawmakers specified a large
number of allegations that had theretofore been held necessary,
I R. S. Mo. (1855) c. 127, p. 1175 et seq.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
and a number of variances that had been expressly held to be
fatal, and provided that none of these should be a ground for
acquitting the accused. Lest some case decided upon some such
unimportant technicality had been overlooked, they added, "nor
for want of the averment of any matter not necessary to be
proved; nor for any other defect or imperfection which does not
tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant
upon the merits." Clearer or more emphatic language could
hardly have been found, nor could a combination of justice and
good common sense be better stated. Surely it is unscientific to
plead facts which need not be proved. No good could be accom-
plished and the accused might reasonably believe that the facts
alleged against him would have to be proved. Why should any
defect which did not have a tendency to prejudice defendant in
his substantial rights, entitle him to an acquittal?
In view of the fact that the Law of 1855 was manifestly taken
from the 14 and 15 Vict. c. 10, it may be pointed out that this act
was quite a comprehensive piece of legislation covering some
twenty-four sections, the purpose of which was clearly to sim-
plify procedure in criminal cases and to remove the technical
niceties and subtleties complained of by Chief Justice Hale more
than two centuries before. As indicating its purpose Parliament
introduced the act with the following preamble:
'Thereas, offenders frequently escape by reason of the
technical strictness of criminal proceedings, in matters not
material to the merits of the case and where such technical
strictness may safely be relaxed in many instances so as to
secure the punishment of the guilty without depriving the
accused of any just means of defence; and whereas, a failure
of justice often takes place on the trial of persons charged
with felony and misdemeanor by reason of variance between
the statement of the indictment on which the trial is had
and the proof of names, dates, matters and circumstances
therein mentioned not material to the merits of the case, and
by misstatements whereof the person on trial cannot have
been prejudiced in the defense.
It is not necessary to set out the English act, but we may point
out that section 1 corresponds to section 22 of the Missouri Act
of 1855, being substantially the same. There is the difference,
however, that the English act provides that the indictment may
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss1/2
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be amended "by some officer of the court or other person" so as
to make it correspond to the evidence. Instead of providing for
an amendment of the indictment, the Missouri statute in effect
provides that the variances therein mentioned shall not be
grounds for acquittal; in other words, they are to be disregarded.
It may well be that the Legislature of Missouri did not approve
of the idea of an officer of the court or some other person amend-
ing an indictment found by a grand jury. In any event they
thought it better to provide that the variance be disregarded un-
less material to the merits of the case and prejudicial to the de-
fense of the defendant.
Section 24 of the English Act corresponds to section 27 of the
Law of 1855 but is not as comprehensive. It merely specifies a
number of formal defects in indictments which shall not in-
validate the same. All of these and quite a number in addition
are specified in the Missouri act. The English act omits the
general provision with which our statute concludes, "nor for
want of any matter not necessary to be proved; nor for any
other defect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice
of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits." The
Missouri statute is more sweeping by far than the English act
from which parts of it were taken. It will be recalled that in the
matter of civil procedure we were in advance of our English
brethren, the Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted in
New York in 1848 and in Missouri in 1849. The influence of the
philosophy of code pleading can be seen in the provision that an
indictment need not allege facts not necessary to be proved.
The legislation just referred to was epoch-making in England
and sufficient to make possible the simple forms of indictment
and procedure in effect there. But what was the effect of the
more comprehensive Missouri statutes? Within five years after
the statute was passed the Supreme Court in State v. Pember-
ton" held an indictment in a murder case bad, because in one
count the name of the person killed was not repeated in the con-
clusion, and the other did not conclude with the words "against
the peace and dignity of the State." As to the latter there can
be no criticism, as the Constitution of Missouri provided that all
(1860), 30 Mo. 376.
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indictments must conclude with those words. As to the former
the opinion can not be justified. The Court stated that it had
always been held necessary to charge a killing to have been done
"feloniously" although that was a mere term of art, as much so
as the word "murder" the omission of which had no tendency to
prejudice the accused. It therefore concluded that since in the
common law indictment the name of the accused was repeated in
the conclusion it was a fatal error to omit this, an error which
the statute of jeofails above, did not remedy. The court took a
very narrow view of section 27 giving no effect to the concluding
sentence.
In 1890 the Supreme Court in State v. Meyers held that unless
the indictment in its conclusion stated that the grand jurors up-
on their oaths charged that the defendant did kill and murder the
deceased the indictment was fatally defective, and that the stat-
ute of jeofails did not cure the error.20  The court (Sherwood,
J.) argued that because at common law the failure to use the
word "murder" in the indictment resulted in the charge being
treated as merely manslaughter, the omission to state in the
conclusion of the indictment that "the grand jurors upon their
oaths charge" vitiated the indictment entirely-a palpable non
sequitur. Moreover the court held that the statute of jeofails
did not cure the omission, entirely ignoring the most important
sentence in the entire act, "nor for any other defect or imper-
fection which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial
rights of the defendant upon the merits." This case was fol-
lowed or cited with approval in many cases and as late as State
v. Ferguson,21 State v. Sanders,22 and State v. Cook .23 In the
later cases of State v. Dawson 24 and State v. Minor,21 its doctrine
was extended to informations.
In State v. Green28 an indictment for murder in the first de-
gree was quashed which alleged that defendant "did shoot off
and discharge at and upon said Joseph Beaumont" a certain
99 Mo. 107, 12 S. W. 516.
(1899), 152 Mo. 98, 53 S. W. 427.
(1900), 158 Mo. 610, 59 S. W. 993.
(1902), 170 Mo. 211, 70 S. W. 403.
24 (1904), 187 Mo. 60, 85 S. W. 526.
(1905), 193 Mo. 598, 92 S. W. 466.
(1892), 111 Mo. 585, 20 S. W. 304.
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pistol, "thereby and thus striking the said Joseph Beaumont with
said leaden bullet inflicting on and in the forehead of said Joseph
B. one mortal wound" because the court said the words "thereby
and thus striking" indicated that the pleader had previously al-
leged a "shooting and wounding" when as a matter of fact he
had not. In State v. Fairlamb27 an indictment for murder was
held bad because it did not allege a felonious intent, although the
indictment charged that the assault had been feloniously made
with a "neapon," namely a gun. This error in spelling, no doubt
a typographical error, was criticised by the court. In State v.
Rector2 defendant was charged with murder in having killed de-
ceased by striking him a hammer-omiting the word "with" and
the indictment was held fatally defective. A similar ruling was
made in State v. Fugerson.29 In State v. Woodward,"o where the
indictment alleged that defendant feloniously "did strike and
beat" the deceased upon the right side of the head with "the club
aforesaid and inflicting and giving to said deceased a mortal
wound" it was held bad because it did not show the wounding
was connected with the felonious assault, since the indictment
did not use the stereotyped language "then and there." These
cases show that for a full half century after the passage of the
important statutes of 1855 the Supreme Court regarded them
with disfavor and either placed a very narrow and unreasonable
construction upon them or ignored them entirely.
In common fairness to the judges of the Court it must be said
that during this period of fifty years there were a number of
cases in which the strict technicalities of the common law were
brushed aside. Thus in State v. Dale,"' where the charge was
murder, the court held the indictment good, though it omitted the
word "premeditatedly," deciding that the word "deliberately" in-
cluded all that was embraced in the, omitted word. And the in-
dictment in State v. Taylor"2 was held good though it charged
that two mortal wounds had been inflicted with one leaden bullet.
(1894), 121 Mo. 137, 25 S. W. 895.
- (1894), 126 Mo. 328, 23 S. W. 1074.
- (1899), 152 Mo. 92, 53 S. W. 427.
(1905), 191 Mo. 617, 90 S. W. 90.
(1892), 108 Mo. 205, 18 S. W. 976.
(1895), 126 Mo. 531, 29 S. W. 598.
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In State v. Jones," an 1854 case, a similar allegation had been
held so inconsistent and repugnant as to vitiate the indictment
and this ruling probably caused the Legislature to amend the
Act of 1845 to write into that of 1855 the words "nor for any
surplusage or repugnant allegation, when there is sufficient mat-
ter alleged to indicate the crime and person charged."
In the past twenty years, and more particularly in the last ten,
the Supreme Court has not only manifested a determination to
give full force and effect to the statute of jeofails, placing a fair
and liberal construction upon a statute intended to be remedial,
but has shown considerable impatience with technical and formal
objections where it did not appear probable that the rights of
the defendant had been prejudiced. A reference to the decisions
of the Court in recent years will show that it is constantly rely-
ing on the statutes of jeofails to avoid reversing cases on trivial
and unimportant technicalities. In 1917 in State v. Borders' 4 a
murder case, the Court held the information good although it did
not allege where the deceased died. Article II, section 22 of the
Constitution of Missouri was invoked but the Court said: "The
charge must contain a certain description of the crime of which
the defendant is accused, and a statement of the facts by which
it is constituted, so as to identify the accusation lest the grand
jury should find a bill for one offense and the defendant be put
on his trial for another." The Court then explains that the
place of death was not a substantive fact, and its averment un-
necessary, stating that this was in accord with reason and the
statute of jeofails and that regardless of what may have been the
rule at common law or may be the rule elsewhere, the omission of
this allegation was not fatal in this state. The Court then pro-
ceeds:
In the enactment of our Statute of jeofails, a purpose was
evinced to free criminal charges of many of the useless tech-
nicalities required at-common law. There is a growing
disposition on the part of the courts in the wholesome ad-
ministration of justice, more evident now than heretofore,
to discourage reversals unless the error claimed to have been
committed deprived the defendant of some substantial right.
20 Mo. 58.
(Mo. 1917), 99 S. W. 180.
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Two years later in State v. FergusoW5 the court held that the
omission of the word "wilfully" in an indictment charging mur-
der did not affect the validity of the indictment, since the words
"with malice aforethought" necessarily implied that the act was
done wilfully. In State v. Webb, ,3 6 a murder case where it was
claimed that the fact that deceased received a wound in the head
instead of in the body as alleged in the indictment was fatal, the
court overruled the point, basing its action on the statute. In
State v. Flannery"7 where there was an error in naming the per-
son alleged to have been killed, the name stated being "Connell"
instead of "O'Connell," the court said:
Defendant knew the nature of the charge preferred
against him, the time and place where it was alleged to have
been committed. Possessed of this knowledge, in what re-
spect could he have suffered injury if the complaint had
charged him with having struck and killed John Smith in-
stead of Olin McConnell? Courts should not lend them-
selves to subterfuges as defences where not even an intima-
tion of prejudice is made. The time has passed, not only in
this state but elsewhere, when pure technicalities, in the
absence of well defined injury to the accused, will be per-
mitted to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal law.
The decision of the Court was clearly correct, for even at com-
mon law the doctrine of idem sonans would be applied in such
case, but the language quoted fairly illustrates the attitude of the
court towards technical defences.
In State v. Hascall3 8 the Court, referring to the rule that in in-
dictments for felony nothing must be left to intendment, explains
the rule as applied in more recent times as follows:
While it is true in a criminal charge that nothing must be
left to intendment or implication, this rule must be con-
strued as having reference to such allegations as are neces-
sary to inform the defendant of the nature and cause of the
accusation and not extrinsic matter, the averment of which
is unnecessary, and if averred need not be proven.
"(1919), 278 Mo. 119, 212 S. W. 339.
(1914), 254 Mo. 414, 162 S. W. 622.
(1915), 263 Mo. 579, 173 S. W. 1053.
(1920), 284 Mo. 607, 226 S. W. 18.
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Surely, this quotation expresses not only the spirit but the mani-
fest meaning of the Statutes of 1855.
Coming to quite recent times it will be observed that the Court
has turned its face more firmly than ever against technical objec-
tions which are not based upon some reasonable showing that
defendant was prejudiced by the failure to observe some formal
procedural requirement. Thus where formerly failure of the
record to show that defendant was arraigned was considered
ground for reversal; 39 today it is not deemed necessary that the
record show this. 40 And now where defendant answers ready
for trial there is a waiver of arraignment.41 In a case where the
indictment was endorsed by the foreman of the grand jury, who
merely signed his name but omitted the description of "Fore-
man," this omission did not affect the validity of the indict-
ment.42 So also a verdict not signed by the foreman was held
good.4 And a failure to state the defendant's name in a verdict
was held not to invalidate it.44
In State v. Bowman45 on a trial for a felony, defendant was
represented by two attorneys. When the time for a recess came
the court inquired whether the parties agreed that the jury might
separate. In reply one of defendant's attorneys stated that he
himself was willing, but upon conferring with his associate the
latter was not willing to have the jury separate. The court
nevertheless permitted a separation, and the appellate court re-
fused to reverse, no showing of prejudice to defendant having
been made. Considering the practice at common law in connec-
tion with the statute, this seems an extreme case. Yet it is quite
improbable that any person should undertake improperly to in-
fluence a jury to find a verdict of guilt. The court was justified
in holding that in the absence of any showing of an attempt to
influence the jury the error, if any, was not prejudicial. More-
= State v. Williams (1893), 117 Mo. 379, 22 S. W. 1104.
"State v. Ferris (Mo. 1929), 16 S. W. (2d) 96.
State v. Borchert (1926), 312 Mo. 447, 279 S. W. 72; State v. Robnett
(1926) 312 Mo. 635, 281 S. W. 29.
State v. Douglas (1925), 312 Mo. 373, 278 S. W. 1016.
,State v. Lewis (Mo. 1926), 278 S. W. 706.
"State v. Stewart (1926), 316 Mo. 150, 289 S. W. 822; State v. Gibson
(Mo. 1927) 300 S. W. 1106.
" (Mo. 1928), 12 S. W. (2d) 51.
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over counsel's somewhat equivocal statement may have been
taken as a consent.
A case illustrating the lengths to which the court will now go
to sustain a conviction in spite of irregularity in procedure,
where no prejudice appears to have resulted, is that of State v.
Wood- where the jury after retiring had the deputy sheriff in-
quire of the judge whether they could find a verdict of guilty but
leave it to the court to assess the punishment, and the court in-
structed the deputy sheriff to tell the jury that they could. He
did so. The safer and better plan would have been for the trial
court to have the jury brought before it, have the foreman ask
the question, and then to have the court answer it. It was ir-
regular to permit (or instruct) the sheriff to communicate with
the jury; and while it was clear that no harm had resulted, one
can readily imagine how the judges of fifty years ago would have
been shocked at such an informal method of procedure and have
felt it their duty to reverse the case as a lesson to trial judges.
For some years there had been a lack of harmony in the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court upon the question of how far the
court must go in a felony case in instructing the jury in the
absence of requests by defendant. There were some cases which
held that the court must instruct "on all questions of law arising
in the case," leaving out the important qualifications of the stat-
ute "necessary for their information in giving their verdict,"
and overlooking the fact that this statute merely prescribed the
order of trial rather than the scope of the instructions. 47 The
Court has now settled the matter, adopting a practical and at
the same time a just view, which is concisely expressed in State
v. English,"8 where the Court held that the statute required that
the jury be instructed on the points necessary for them to know
to render an intelligent verdict and not others-unless there was
a request for broader instructions. The Court said: "What is
meant by the expression 'collateral to the main issue' is stated
in the case of State v. Lackey, where quoting from an early case,
the opinion says it is the duty of the court 'to require the jury
"(Mo. 1928), 11 S. W. (2d) 1040.
"R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4025.
"(1925), 308 Mo. 695, 274 S. W. 470.
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to find all of the essential elements of an offence embraced with-
in the charge, anything else is collateral.'" And the Court now
requires of defendant's counsel who desire instructions on col-
lateral matters that they present such instructions to the court
instead of merely making an oral request that the court instruct
upon this or that proposition. While the decisions just referred
to indicate the attitude of the Court upon matters of formal pro-
cedure, recent decisions of the Court on the sufficiency of indict-
ments, and the emphatic language employed by every one of the
judges composing the division of the Court to which criminal
appeals are assigned show the advanced views held by the judges.
The old case of State v. Meyers,49 which was wrong in prin-
ciple, was nevertheless followed as a precedent over so long a
period of time that the Court hesitated definitely to overrule it.
But its doctrine was no doubt distasteful to the judges. The
first step in the process of getting away from it was to refuse to
apply its doctrine to informations, limiting it strictly to indict-
ments.50  This was merely a step in the right direction. Since
informations and indictments serve the same purpose, the same
rules should apply as to the necessary averments of all matters
of substance. The only differences would be those of a formal
nature based upon the fact that one is prepared and returned by
the prosecuting attorney, the other by the grand jury. The
learned judge who wrote the opinion in State iv. Lee evidently
felt a delicacy about overruling a case which had been so often
followed. However, the reasoning of his opinion indicates that
his views were not in harmony with those expressed in the ear-
lier case.
A few years later the question came before the Court squarely
in Ex parte Keet 51 The petitioner had been convicted of mur-
der in the second degree on an indictment which lacked the for-
mal conclusion used in common law precedents, and therefore he
sought his discharge on habeas corpus. In its opinion the Court
held it was not necessary to follow the formal conclusions of
common law indictments and after an exhaustive review of the
IN. 16 above.
IState v. Lee (1924), 303 Mo. 246, 259 S. W. 798; State v. Renneson
(1924), 306 Mo. 473, 267 S. W. 850.
(1926), 315 Mo. 695, 287 S. W. 463.
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whole subject expressly overruled State v. Meyers and the line of
cases following it. Perhaps a brief quotation from this opinion
would be interesting as well as illuminating. It reads:
From the foregoing historical resume it appears that
years ago in England there was in force a statute which de-
prived persons guilty of "wilful murder" of the "benefit of
clergy," and that in order to bring the case within the stat-
ute it was deemed necessary to use the language of the stat-
ute itself in describing the offense-a rule of pleading as
applicable to purely statutory crimes frequently invoked.
At the same time it was necessary in indictments for murder
to describe with particularity the weapon used in killing,
and to allege its value. This weapon was forfeited to the
king, by whom it was supposed to be applied to pious uses.
Under our law there is no more reason why an indictment
should rehearse the ancient formula in conclusion than that
it should allege the value of the weapon with which the
homicide was committed. It is a mere form without life or
substance, which we have been idolatrously following. If
its omissions be regarded as a "defect or imperfection," it is
one "which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial
rights of the defendant upon the merits" and which there-
fore does not render the indictment invalid."
This decision was by the Court en bane and all the judges con-
curred, except one who was absent.
In the later case of State v. Glass,52 a case of murder in the sec-
ond degree based on tan information the Court, referring with ap-
proval to Ex parte Keet, says: "We pointed out in State v. Lee 3
that this formal sonorous conclusion was a part of the habili-
ments of the charge and performed the same office for the in-
dictment that judicial robes performed for the judges, investing
them with apparent dignity, but adding nothing to the weight or
soundness of their judgment." The objection made to the in-
formation was that it lacked the formal conclusion, an objection
which made very little impression upon the Court.
Another case should be cited in this connection as showing how
far the Supreme Court has departed from old common law rules
in criminal cases. In State v. Ferris54 the Court said:
(1927), 318 Mo. 611, 300 S. W. 691.
(1924), 303 Mo. 246, 259 S. W. 798.
"(Mo. 1929), 16 S. W. (2d) 96.
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Allegations in the information not necessary to be proved
may be rejected. Sec. 3908 R. S. 1919. Defendant suffer-
ed no injury therefrom and has no ground for complaint.
The rule of the common law that charges of crime should be
certain to every intent without any intendment to the con-
trary is no longer the rule in this jurisdiction especially in
regard to statutory offences. Allegation of certainty to a
common intent or reasonable certainty are in such cases, all
that are required. By this is meant such particularity in al-
legations that the identity of the offence may be determined
from the face of the charge, that the accused may be enabled
to know what he has to meet that he may prepare his de-
fense, and authorize a conviction or acquittal to be pleaded
in bar to another prosecution for the same offence.
In a very recent case, State v. Carson," it was decided that the
state could appeal from an order setting aside a conviction and
granting a new trial because of the insufficiency of the indict-
ment, and it was further held that an indictment for selling
mortgaged property was not fatally defective because it did not
allege that the mortgaged bank was a corporation. As to the
latter point the Court overruled a line of cases and in so doing
gave an expression of the present tendency of the courts in this
language:
It must be remembered that the rulings upon which the
defendant relies were made when technical errors, having
nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of the accused,
were generally held to be sufficient to authorize a reversal.
They were in accordance with the habit of mind which the
older practitioners had acquired from long familiarity with
the tendency to protect one charged with crime in the en-
joyment of every right and privilege which could be con-
strued in his favor, regardless of whether it affected his
guilt or innocence. The tendency now is to look at the sub-
stance of the accusation and not its form. The rules of
pleading and procedure are to be construed so as to deter-
mine whether the defendant on trial is or is not in fact guilty
of the crime charged, and not whether through some formal
irregularity in the proceeding against him he may dodge the
issue of guilt or no guilt. It is necessary only to preserve
to him all the rights which enable him to make his defense
upon the facts affecting his guilt or innocence.
(Mo. 1929), 18 S. W. (2d) 457.
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The foregoing review justifies the conclusion that the Missouri
Legislature three-quarters of a century ago took a decidedly ad-
vanced position in the matter of liberalizing the law of criminal
procedure; that for a long time thereafter the Supreme Court
construed these statutes strictly and gave but limited effect to
them; that within the past twenty-five years, however, the
Court's attitude has completely changed, so that it is now giving
the fullest effect to the spirit as well as the letter of the statutes.
Strange to say, in latter years the Legislature has shown an
unwillingness to move forward and enact laws necessary to still
more simplify criminal procedure and make it more effective in
the administration of justice. Having made an exhaustive sur-
vey of the administration of criminal justice in this State,
the Missouri Society for Criminal Justice caused some fifty bills
to be introduced in the legislative session of 1927. As to the
necessity or wisdom of some of these there might have been room
for differences of opinion, but it is inconceivable that among the
number introduced there were not some possessing unquestioned
merit. Still not one was enacted into law. Nothing daunted,
the Society caused most of these bills to be again introduced in
the session of 1929 where they suffered the same fate. Whether
the law makers regarded these efforts as an attempt to coerce
them to legislate along certain lines, or whether the program was
too ambitious and fell from its own weight, the fact remains that
it received scant consideration. Probably if but a few of the
more important bills had been introduced, some at least would
have met with favor and have become laws.
One bill provided for a simple form of indictment, but also
provided that the accused might demand a bill of particulars. It
would be much more in keeping with the spirit of progress to say
in an indictment for murder in the first degree, that the grand
jurors of the City of St. Louis upon their oaths charge John
Smith with murder in the first degree, in this, that on January
10, 1929, in the City of St. Louis, Mo., he wilfully, deliberately
and of his malice aforethought shot A. B. with a pistol and in-
flicted a wound on his head, from which he died on January 12th,
1929, than to follow the long form now in use containing a num-
ber of averments which need not be proven, and endless and use-
less repetitions.
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Yet when this bill was read in the Senate, a distinguished
member, who was a lawyer, objected to it because he said it
would unsettle the entire criminal procedure in Missouri. No
doubt he was sincere, but he evidently had given the matter lit-
tle or no study or thought. Had he given the matter any study
he must have known that as early as 1855 the English statute
referred to above provided that an indictment for murder need
not set forth the manner in which nor the means by which the
death of the deceased was caused, but need only charge that "de-
fendant did feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought
kill and murder the deceased." He might also have known that
the State Supreme Court had decided that "malice aforethought
included the idea of wilfulness so that the omission of either
word, "wilfully" or "premeditatively," or both would not
vitiate an indictment. Indeed he might have known that so long
ago as 1545 the first of these remedial statutes was passed
which dispensed with the necessity of alleging in an indictment
for murder the kind of instrument with which death was pro-
duced. 6 In England since 1915 an indictment for murder
simply states that the grand jury charges defendant with mur-
I Since this Statute, passed in the reign of Henry VIII, shows in its pre-
amble how thoroughly the legislators at that early day appreciated the
absurdity of requiring a number of allegations in indictments which need
not be established by evidence, we quote the statute in full: "Where before
this time it was and yet is commonly used in all indictments and inquisi-
tions of treason, murder, felony, trespass and divers other, to have com-
prised and put in every the same indictments and inquisitions these words,
Vi et armis, and in divers of the same indictments to declare the manner
of the force and arms; that is to say, Vi et armis videlicet, baculis, cultel-
lis, arcubus at sagittis, or other such like words in effect, where of truth
the parties so indicted had no manner of such weapons at the time of the
said offense, committed and done; yet in default and lack of the same words,
the said indictments were, and yet be, taken as void in law, for to put any
person to answer thereunto; and the party or parties so indicted, for lack
of the same words not being comprised and put in the said indictments
have taken advantage thereof, and have avoided the said indictments by
writ or writs of error, or by plea upon his or their appearance, as the same
case did require; For reformation whereof be it enacted by the King, our
sovereign lord, with the assent of the lords, spiritual and temporal, and of
the commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of
the same, That, from the feast of the nativity of our Lord God, next com-
ing, these words, Vi et armis, viz., cum baculis, cultellis, arcubus et sagittis,
or such other like, shall not of necessity be put or comprized in any inquisi-
tion or indictment." 37 Hen. VIII c. 8.
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der. Then follows: "Particulars of offence: A. B. on the -
day of- 19- in the County of- murdered J. S."-Not only
this, but there are some half-dozen common law states in our Re-
public which have long ago adopted a simple form of indict-
ment, and the even course of justice has not been disturbed. In-'
deed a little reflection will satisfy any reasonable man that it is
much fairer to have a criminal indictment charge the essential
facts in simple, plain, concise, modern language which the ac-
cused can understand than to fill it with technical terms which
he does not understand, with useless repetitions, and worse still,
with allegations which not only need not be proved but often are
absolutely untrue in fact. This is not scientific; it is not even
just or fair to the defendant. The act proposed was not only
based on correct principles of pleading, but it made the law speak
in plain language and it gave to the defendant a valuable right
which he does not now enjoy-that of demanding a bill of par-
ticulars. At the present time he is charged with shooting a cer-
tain person in the City of St. Louis on a certain day. The state
may prove that the shooting occurred on an entirely different day
and the indictment will still be good. St. Louis is a large city
and to say that an act was committed in this City is not very
specific. Now with a short indictment and the right to demand
a bill of particulars the defendant's substantial rights are much
more fully protected. He could demand to know the exact day
and at least the approximate time of day, and he could demand
to know the particular place where he is supposed to have com-
mitted the crime. At present if defendant desires this infor-
mation he is driven to take the depositions of the witnesses
whose names appear on the indictment. Yet the very persons
who opposed this and other measures took the lofty position that
they were protecting accused persons from over-zealous and im-
practical reformers who were more intent on filling our peni-
tentiaries than seeing that justice was done.
This review of the legislation in this State and of the course
of judicial opinion indicates quite clearly that reform in the
criminal procedure of Missouri was initiated by the Legislature,
a phenomenon by no means uncommon; that the courts at first
and for a considerable time proceeded cautiously in applying
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these statutes; but as their wisdom was tested and proved the
courts not only regarded them much more favorably and placed
a much more liberal construction upon them, but became imbued
with the spirit which led to their enactment and wiped out many
useless technicalities which are in no wise covered by these
statutes.
A comparison of the criminal law in Missouri as we find it to-
day in decisions of the Supreme Court and existing statutes with
the law as it existed in Blackstone's time or in 1820 when Mis-
souri was admitted into the Union or in 1845 or as recently as
1905, can give only cause for deep satisfaction. The law has
progressed steadily, and if its growth has been slower than one
might wish, it is something to know that it has grown steadily
in the right direction. If occasionally we find a decision which
seems to take a step backward we also find that in due course it is
corrected.
It is no doubt true that in other states legislation has advanced
faster and further than in Missouri. But legislatures are re-
sponsive to the popular will, and when the Missouri Assembly
becomes satisfied that the people are earnest in demanding cer-
tain legislation it will soon follow.
The importance of a simple, direct and effective procedure in
the courts, securing a fairly speedy determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused, will be conceded on all sides, as will be
the bbligation of the legal profession to aid in freeing the law
from unecessary procedural impediments; but the fact remains
that there is something more important requiring serious atten-
tion because it is fundamental. The most serious problem is not
that of determining the guilt or innocence of one charged with
crime, but the question, "What causes people to commit crimes?"
And then there is the other, hardly less serious and important
question, "What shall we do with the so-called criminal ?" How
shall we treat him? Hanging or electrocuting men does not
seem to deter others from committing murder, and penitentiaries
have not been an outstanding success as institutions for reform-
ing offenders. Haven't our methods of treating these unfor-
tunates been wrong?-and how may they be improved? These
are questions which call for the best thought and study of ex-
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perts in many branches of science-sociology, psychology, medi-
cine, economics, politics, and we might add anthropology. When
we know more about the causes of crime and the best methods of
treating offenders, it will then be for the law-making branch of
the Government to enact laws which will enable the courts to deal
with crime more scientifically and effectively.
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